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Abstract 
It is generally assumed that Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has the potential to organize the 
flow of material in supply chains more efficiently. Based on the two-tiered Joint Economic Lot Size 
(JELS) model by Banerjee, this article analyzes how the increase in efficiency affects the order and 
production policies and therefore the total costs of the supply chain, and the individual costs of the 
companies in question. The analysis takes into account different bargaining power constellations and 
cost structures between supplier and customer. By employing simple methods of game theory it is 
shown in which cases the implementation of RFID is beneficial and how the disadvantaged company 
should be compensated. 
Keywords: RFID, JELS, supply chain, lot size, purchasing cost. 
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1 MOTIVATION 
The Just-In-Time Philosophy (JIT) is known to be one of the main reasons for the international 
success of the Japanese Industry (especially automotive and electronics) (Nakamura & Sakakibara & 
Schroeder 1998). The main goal of the JIT philosophy is to consistently avoid waste of all kinds. A 
key point is a close and long-term oriented relationship between supplier and customer. From the 
perspective of the material flow, this commitment comprises exact arrangements concerning time and 
quantities of deliveries. To avoid unnecessary stock during production, delivery takes the form of 
small lots, which are only ordered when the need for them actually arises (Pull), so they are delivered 
as close to the time of production as possible (Banerjee & Kim 1995, Monden 1998). Actual lot sizes 
are a result of negotiations between supplier and customer. Depending on the balance of power 
between the two partners, a situation can arise in which the dominant partner can enforce a lot size 
which is optimal for him, but only suboptimal for the other partner. In the long term, this one sided 
optimisation leads to higher costs for the whole system and consequently, by the JIT definition, to 
avoidable waste (Aderohunmu & Mobolurin & Bryson 1995). Based on this perception, Banerjee 
created a model for the determination of a joint economic lot size (JELS) and analyzed how total costs 
and the costs for the individual partner change when lot sizes are mutually agreed (Banerjee 1986). He 
showed that mutually agreed order and production policies lead to a minimisation of total relevant 
costs in the supply chain. 
To further decrease stocks, organisations tend to order even smaller lot sizes. This only makes sense 
though, if the costs to place and release an order decrease. In this context the use of RFID is discussed. 
In several pilot projects RFID has shown to have the potential to decrease order cost by designing the 
material flows more efficiently (Asif & Mandviwalla 2005, Kärkkäinen & Holmström 2002). To make 
use of those potential advantages, it is necessary that suppliers equip their products (or the pallets) 
with RFID tags. Thus, considering the balance of power mentioned above, it could happen that 
suppliers are forced to tag their products in this case. 
This development is by no means limited to JIT. Looking at vendor-purchaser relationships in retail 
markets, it can be observed that it is usually the retailer who takes the dominant role. Chances are that 
during the introduction of RFID, purchasers will decide about the introduction of the technology and 
suppliers will be forced to comply (Agarwal 2001). For example, retail heavyweight Wal-Mart coerces 
its Top 100 suppliers to equip their products with RFID tags on the pallet and box level (Roberti 2003, 
Williams 2004). The costs of tagging the products with RFID have to be borne by the vendors. 
Additionally, the usage expectations for RFID are much higher for the purchaser compared to those 
for the vendor (Metro Group 2004). Therefore, it is generally assumed that the purchasers introduce 
RFID at the expense of the vendor. 
This article aims to critically question this generalised proposition. In the following, it will be 
analyzed what impact the introduction of RFID has on both total and individual costs for each partner 
under different constellations of bargaining power. Apart from the already mentioned situation where 
the purchaser is in the dominant position, the article will also account for the rare situation where the 
vendor is in a more powerful position (monopoly position of the vendor). 
The article at hand is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the JELS model by Banerjee. 
Building on that, chapter 3 shows which parameters of the model are affected by the introduction of 
RFID and analyzes the effects of those variations under ceteris paribus conditions. The article 
concludes in chapter 4 with a summary and an outlook. 
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2 BANERJEE’S JOINT ECONOMIC LOT SIZE MODEL 
The JELS model belongs to the group of integrated buyer-supplier inventory models (Goyal & Gupta 
1989, Sharafali & Co 2000). The model is derived from the relatively simple economic-lot-size 
formula based on Harris (Harris 1915). Thus, it presumes a lot-for-lot-strategy known from various 
industries (e.g. automotive industry). Even though Harris’ economic-lot-size formula is not very often 
used in practice, derived methods (e.g. least unit cost procedure) are very common in state-of-the-art 
ERP systems. The model is based on the following assumptions: a vendor and a purchaser of a good 
with constant demand are considered. The vendor and the purchaser determine the production, 
respectively order lot size with the intention to minimise decision relevant costs. The decision relevant 
costs of the vendor comprise setup and inventory costs and those of the purchaser comprise order and 
inventory costs. The purchaser periodically orders a given amount Q. Upon receipt of a purchase 
order, the vendor starts producing and delivers once the whole lot is produced (Pull). Furthermore it is 
assumed that the vendor’s annual production rate is higher than the demand rate. The following 
notational scheme is adopted: 
D = annual demand or usage of the inventory item (demand rate) 
P = vendor’s annual production rate for this item, 
A = purchaser’s ordering cost per order, 
S = vendor’s setup cost per setup, 
rp = purchaser’s annual inventory carrying charge (expressed as a fraction of monetary value), 
rv = vendor’s annual inventory carrying charge (expressed as a fraction of monetary value), 
Cv = unit production cost incurred by the vendor 
Cp = unit purchase cost paid by the purchaser 
Q = order (Qp) or production (Qv) lot size in units 
TRC = total relevant cost 
2.1 Individual Lot Size 
The economic lot sizes of the purchaser and the vendor are obtained by using the well known formulas 
of Harris. Table 1 summarizes the results of the individual optimizations. 
 
 Purchaser Vendor 
General 
cost 
function 
( ) pCpr2pQApQDpQpTRC +=  (1) ( ) vCvrPD2v
Q
S
vQ
D
vQvTRC +=  (4) 
Economic 
lot size 
pCpr
2DA*
pQ =  (2) 
vCvr
2PS*
vQ =  (5) 
Minimum 
total cost ( ) pCp2DAr*pQpTRC =  (3) ( )
P
vCv2Sr*
vQvTRC =  (6) 
Table 1 Results of the individual optimizations 
Transforming the equation for Qv*  as follows  
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vCvDr
pCpPr
A
S
pCpr
2DA
2DA
pCpr
pCpr
2DA
vCvr
2PS
vCvr
2PS*
vQ === , 
noting that 
pCpr
2DA*
pQ =  and defining A
S
α =  and 
pCpPr
vCvDrβ =  the relationship between Qp*  and Qv* 
can be expressed as  
*
pQ
β
α*
vQ =  (7)
Assuming a lot-for-lot-strategy (Qv = Qp), α represents the ratio of the vendor’s setup cost per setup 
(S) to the purchaser’s ordering cost per order (A) and β the ratio of the vendor’s total annual (or 
periodic) carrying costs to the purchaser’s total annual (or periodic) carrying costs. Due to a surcharge 
of the vendor, the unit purchase cost paid by the purchaser (Cp) is higher than the unit production cost 
incurred by the vendor (Cv). Thus with a vendor’s production rate higher than the purchaser’s demand 
rate and equal inventory carrying charges, β tends to be very small (0<β<1). 
Considering a lot-for-lot-strategy (Qv = Qp) we can differentiate two situations: 
• (a) the dominant purchaser determines the lot size (purchaser’s economic-lot-size) 
• (b) the dominant vendor determines the lot size (vendor’s economic-lot-size) 
In the following we will analyse the effects of vendor’s economic-lot-size on purchaser (a) and the 
effects of the purchaser’s economic-lot-size on vendor (b): 
(a) 
If the purchaser’s economic-lot-size is adopted by the vendor as production lot size, the total relevant 
cost of the vendor is 
( ) vrvCPD2*vQαβ*vQDSβαvCvrPD2
*
pQ
S*
pQ
D*
pQvTRC +=+= . 
Noting that ( )*vQvTRC21vrvCPD2*vQ*vQDS ==  the above equation simplifies to 
( ) ( )*vQvTRC
α
β
β
α
2
1*
pQvTRC ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += . (8)
The factor ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
α
β
β
α
2
1
 can be interpreted as a vendors cost penalty factor for producing the 
economic-lot-size of the purchaser. 
(b) 
If the vendor’s economic-lot-size is adopted by the purchaser as ordering lot size, the total relevant 
cost of the purchaser is 
( ) prpC2
*
pQ
β
α
*
pQ
DA
α
β
pCpr2
*
vQA*
vQ
D*
vQpTRC +=+=  
This equation can be simplified to 
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( ) ( )*pQpTRC
α
β
β
α
2
1*
vQpTRC ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += . (9)
Note that the purchaser’s cost penalty factor for adopting the vendor’s production lot size as ordering 
lot size is the same as the vendor’s cost penalty factor for producing the economic-lot-size of the 
purchaser. 
2.2 Joint Economic Lot Size 
The joint TRC (JTRC) can be obtained by adding equation (1) and equation (4): 
( ) vCvrP
D
2
Q
S
Q
D
pCpr2
Q
A
Q
D
QJTRC +++=  (10)
To get the joint economic lot size, we have to set the first derivative with respect to Q equal to zero: 
prpCvrvCP
D
A)2D(S*
jQ
+
+=  
(11)
With α and β this equation can be rewritten to 
β1
α1*
pQ
*
jQ +
+=  (12)
and 
β
1
1
α
1
1
*
vQ
*
jQ
+
+
= . (13)
If the purchaser’s order size is Qj* instead of Qp* the purchaser’s TRC is given by 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )*pQpTRCβ1α1
βα
2
1
1
*
jQpTRC ++
++
=  (14)
and if the vendor’s order size is Qj* instead of Qv* the vendor’s TRC is given by 
( ) ( )*vQvTRC
β
1
1
α
1
1
β
1
α
1
2
1
1
*
jQvTRC
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++
++
= . (15)
For a profound discussion on the findings refer to Banerjee (1986). 
3 RFID IN BANERJEE’S JELS-MODEL 
3.1 Influence of RFID on the parameters 
The literature identifies a multitude of advantages which can be realised by using RFID in the supply 
chain (e.g. Michael & McCathie 2005, Angeles 2005). Analysing the influence of RFID on the 
parameters of the JELS model, it has to be noted that particularly the ordering cost per order are 
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influenced (Asif & Mandviwalla 2005, Michael & McCathie 2005, Kärkkäinen 2003). Exemplified 
influences include: 
• Through Track & Trace, problems in logistics can be identified and solved much quicker. Thus, 
logistics cost decrease, which in turn directly influences order costs. 
• With RFID Gateways at the stock receipt, incoming goods can automatically be tracked. Manual 
labour, e.g. to verify delivery quantities compared to order quantities, can mostly be avoided. 
• Through RFID, internal transportation and storage can be designed more efficient and less error 
prone. This allows for a higher degree of automation of repeat orders in the sense of the inter-
company Kanban principle. 
In fact, RFID also directly impacts the other parameters. Yet, based on the dominant influence of order 
costs, the other influences can and will be neglected in the following analysis. 
3.2 Individual Lot Size Optimization 
We now assume that the use of RFID reduces the purchaser’s ordering cost per order (A) by the 
factor i: ( )Ai1RFIDA −= . Table 2 summarizes the purchaser’s results of an individual optimization. 
 
General cost 
function ( ) pCpr2pQRFIDApQDpQRFIDp,TRC +=  (16) 
Economic 
lot size *pQi1
pCpr
2DA
i1* RFIDp,Q −=−=  (17) 
Minimum 
total cost ( ) ( )*pQpTRCi-1* RFIDp,QRFIDp,TRC =  (18) 
Table 2. Purchaser’s results of an individual optimization with RFID  
Assuming that the parameters of the equation for the vendor’s economic-lot-size do not change by the 
use of RFID and using α and β, we can express the relationship between Qv* and Q*p,RFID as 
*
RFIDp,Qβ
α
i1
1*
vQ −=  (19)
If we suppose that the vendor adopts the new purchaser’s economic lot size as production lot size, the 
vendor’s TRC is given by 
( )*vQvTRC
α
β
i1
β
α
i1
1
2
1
vCvCP
D
2
*
vQ
α
β
i1*
vQ
DS
β
α
i1
1
vCvCP
D
2
*
RFIDp,Q
*
RFIDp,Q
DS
)* RFIDp,(QvTRC
⋅−+−=
−+−=
+=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
 (20)
In the situation the vendor has adopted the purchaser’s economic lot size as production lot size and the 
vendor changes the economic lot size due to the introduction of RFID from Q*p to Q*p,RFID, the 
vendor’s relative saving is  
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1β
α
α
β
2
1
α
β
i1
β
α
i1
1
2
1
1
)*p(QvTRC
)* RFIDp,(QvTRC +
+
−+−−=+−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
 (21)
 
Figure 1 shows a plot of the vendor’s relative saving against the two parameters α and β in the case 
i=0.3. 
saving %
β
α
 
Figure 1.  Vendor’s relative saving  
Figure 1 shows that in order to assess whether the use of RFID leads to increased or decreased costs 
for the vendor, the relation between the two parameters α and β to each other, already discussed by 
Banjeree, is significant. In situations where α>>β, vendor’s cost increase (and for β>>α vice versa). 
This effect can be explained as follows. As mentioned above, with α>>β the optimal production lot 
size of the vendor is larger than the optimal order size of the purchaser (Q*v>Q*p). By introducing 
RFID the purchaser’s optimal order size further decreases and the difference between the two optima 
increases. If the vendor adopts the new policy of the purchaser, his costs will also increase. In the case 
of β>>α the optimal production lot of the vendor is smaller than the optimal order quantity of the 
purchaser (Q*p>Q*v). Through the introduction of RFID the optimal order quantity decreases and thus 
approximates to the optimal production lot size of the vendor. In this way the vendor profits from the 
introduction of RFID, too. Figure 2 shows that the difference between the optimal production lot size 
and the optimal order quantity increases for α>>β and decreases for β>>α. 
 
QQvQpQp,RFID
QQv QpQp,RFID
α >> β
β >> α
 
Figure 2. Economic Lot Sizes in different cost-situations 
If we now suppose that the purchaser adopted the vendor’s economic lot size as order lot size and 
introduces RFID, the purchaser’s TRC is given by 
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)*p(QpTRC
β
α
α
β
i)(1
2
1
prpC2
*
pQ
β
α
i)A(1
*
pQ
β
α
D
prpC2
*
vQ
RFIDA*
vQ
D
)*v(QRFIDp,TRC
⋅+⋅−=
+−=
+=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
 (22)
Given the situation that the purchaser has adopted the vendor’s economic lot size as order lot size and 
introduces RFID, the purchaser’s relative saving is 
1
β
α
α
β
2
1
β
α
α
β
i)(1
2
1
1
)*v(QpTRC
)*v(QRFIDp,TRC +
+
+⋅−
−=+−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
 (23)
Figure 3 shows a plot of the purchaser’s relative saving against the two parameters α and β in the case 
i=0.3. 
saving %
β
α  
Figure 3. Purchaser’s relative saving 
The previous considerations did not account for the costs of introducing and using RFID. In the 
following, research will be undertaken to show how the costs of using RFID have to be distributed and 
what kind of compensations, if necessary, have to be made from one market partner to another so that 
no one is disadvantaged through the usage of RFID. 
Market partners will incur costs for the introduction as well as for the usage of RFID (in the following, 
costs attributed to the manufacturer will be labelled RCRFID,v, those attributed to the purchaser 
RCRFID,p). It is obvious that market partners will only take on these costs if they are exceeded by the 
respective savings. As shown in the foregone investigations, market partners benefit to varying 
degrees from the introduction of RFID, so consequently in the following it will be investigated how 
the costs have to be distributed, so that none of the market partners is worse off afterwards. Three 
different situations have to be considered: 
1. Dominant purchaser and α>>β: As lot sizes decrease because of the introduction of RFID, total 
costs for the manufacturer increase. Consequently, he will resist the introduction of RFID as long as he 
does not get compensated for it. Compensation could potentially take the form of increased prices. In 
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order for none of the partners being worse off than they were initially, that increase in price ΔCp would 
have to be under the condition of 
 
( )( )pRFID,RC)*p(QpTRCi11D1
pΔCvRFID,RC)
*
p(QvTRC1
β
α
α
β
2
1
α
β
i1
β
α
i1
1
2
1
D
1
−⋅−−≤
≤−⋅−
+
−+−
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
 (24)
 
2. Dominant purchaser and β>>α: As both purchaser and vendor benefit from the introduction of 
RFID, each individual partner has to assess whether the savings through RFID exceed the costs. If this 
is not the case for one partner, he would have to negotiate with the other partner whether he would 
compensate the difference. 
3. Dominant vendor: As only the purchaser profits from the introduction of RFID, he would have to 
compensate for vendor’s RFID cost and offer further financial incentives to him. The maximum size 
of the compensation and the financial incentive can be calculated as follows 
 
pRFID,RC)
*
v(QpTRC
β
α
α
β
2
1
β
α
α
β
i)(1
2
1
−⋅
+
+⋅−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
 (25)
 
3.3 Joint Lot Size Optimization 
With the assumption that the use of RFID reduces the purchaser’s ordering cost per order (A) by the 
factor i, the joint economic lot size is given by 
prpCvrvCP
D
)RFIDAi)(12D(S*
RFIDj,Q
+
⋅−+=  
(26)
 
Using α and β we can transform this equation to 
β1
αi)(1*
pQ
*
RFIDj,Q +
+−=  (27)
and 
β
1
1
α
i)(1
1
*
vQ
*
RFIDj,Q
+
−+
= . (28)
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We can now show that 
( ) ( )*pQpTRC
β)α)(1i)((1
β)i)(1(α
2
1
i)(1
*
RFIDj,QRFIDp,TRC ++−
⋅−++−
=  (29)
and 
( ) ( )*vQvTRC
β
1
1
α
i1
1
β
1
α
i1
2
1
1
*
RFIDj,QvTRC
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−+
+−+
= . (30)
The equations (31) and (32) express the purchaser’s and the vendor’s relative cost savings in the case 
that the purchaser and the vendor agreed on a joint economic lot size in the past and introduce RFID: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( )β1α1
βα
2
1
1
β)α)(1i)((1
β)i)(1(α
2
1
i)(1
1*
jQpTRC
*
RFIDj,QRFIDp,TRC-
*
jQpTRC
++
++
++−
⋅−++−
−=  (31)
 
( ) ( )( )
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++
++
+−+
+−+
−=
β
1
1
α
1
1
β
1
α
1
2
1
1
β
1
1
α
i1
1
β
1
α
i1
2
1
1
1*
jQvTRC
*
RFIDj,QvTRC-
*
jQvTRC  (32)
Figures 4 and 5 show plots of the purchaser’s and the vendor’s relative saving against the two 
parameters α and β in the case i=0.3. 
saving %
β α
saving %
β α
 
Figure 4. Vendor’s relative saving       Figure 5. Purchaser’s relative saving 
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Figure 4 shows that the purchaser can definitely realise cost savings through the introduction of RFID. 
The highest cost savings can be achieved in situations where α is very small and β very large. It also 
becomes clear that parameter α has bigger impact on the cost saving potentials of the purchaser. In 
situations in which α is very small, the proportion of vendor’s setup cost to purchaser’s order cost is 
particularly small. In case of such an isolated optimisation, the purchaser will aim to order as 
infrequently as possible, as order costs are very high compared to inventory costs. Considering a 
mutual optimisation, the purchaser has to compromise which leads to a situation, where order costs are 
higher than storage costs (unlike in the isolated optimisation). Thus, if the introduction of RFID 
decreases order costs in particular, it leads to the highest cost savings. 
Figure 5 clearly shows that particularly in the situation where β is large and α is small, the introduction 
of RFID leads to cost savings for the vendor. Yet, for the majority of possible parameter combinations, 
the cost saving potential for the vendor is low or he will even incur further costs. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
On the basis of the JELS-Model by Banerjee, the analysis so far showed in detail how the introduction 
of RFID impacts on both total and individual cost of the purchaser and vendor under the condition of 
different bargaining power structures. 
As already shown, it is commonly believed that the purchaser introduces RFID at the expense of the 
vendor. On the basis of the findings so far (which are summarised in table 3) this over simplified 
statement must be revised. Due to the usage of RFID, order lot sizes can be optimised and suppliers 
can, under certain circumstances, benefit from the introduction of RFID, even though they do not 
necessarily have any direct advantages from using it and even have to bear the costs for RFID tags. 
Furthermore, we have proposed compensation methods, which can be applied to convince partners to 
introduce RFID. The article at hand should be seen as an incentive to incite companies into 
considering  inter-company aspects when it comes to making an investment decision for or against 
RFID and negotiate with respective partners about potential compensation. 
The abstract level in an easy to understand model, as used in the article at hand, can help to understand 
the complexity of the interdependencies of these inter-company considerations. Yet, due to its inherent 
simplifications, it is not alone suitable as a basis for decision making. 
 
dominant vendor dominant purchaser 
α>>β  
(Q*v > Q*p) 
↓↓↑ jTRCpTRCvTRC  
? RFID is used as the purchaser is in the 
dominant position and profits from its 
introduction. The purchaser could 
potentially compensate the vendor 
Individual Lot Size 
O
ptim
ization 
β>>α  
(Q*p > Q*v) 
↓↓→ jTRCpTRCvTRC  
? RFID is only implemented if the 
purchaser covers the costs. Maximum 
compensation per RFID tag: *
vQ
i)A(1−
  ↓↓↓ jTRCpTRCvTRC  
? RFID is used as both partners benefit 
from its introduction. 
α>>β  
(Q*v > Q*p) 
↓↓↑ jTRCpTRCvTRC  
? RFID will be used as total costs decrease. The purchaser has to compensate the 
vendor if necessary. 
Joint Lot Size 
O
ptim
ization β>>α  (Q*p > Q*v) 
↓↓↓ jTRCpTRCvTRC  
? RFID will be used as both partners benefit from its introduction. 
Table 3.  Summary of all considered situations 
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